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Abstract
We use techniques from evolutionary game theory to analyze the conditions under which guilt can
provide individual fitness benefits, and so evolve. In particular, we focus on the benefits of guilty apology.
We consider models where actors err in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma and have the option to apologize.
Guilt either improves the trustworthiness of apology, or imposes a cost on actors who apologize. We
analyze the stability and likelihood of evolution of such a ‘guilt-prone’ strategy against cooperators,
defectors, grim-triggers, and individuals who offer fake apologies, but continue to defect. We find that
in evolutionary models guilty apology is more likely to evolve in cases where actors interact repeatedly
over long periods of time, where the costs of apology are low or moderate, and where guilt is hard to
fake. Researchers interested in naturalized ethics, and emotion researchers, can employ these results to
assess the plausibility of fuller accounts of the evolution of guilt.
1 Introduction
Some emotions provide fairly straightforward fitness advantages. Fear, for example, provides obvious evolu-
tionary benefits, like avoiding predation by tigers. Guilt poses more of an evolutionary puzzle. Deem and
Ramsey (2016b) point out that this emotion is associated with behaviors that, initially, seem maladaptive.
Guilt-prone individuals behave altruistically, even in cases where they do not expect to be caught. Those who
feel guilty after a transgression accept punishment readily, and even punish themselves. For this reason, one
might think that guilt evolved for its benefits to human groups, rather than individuals. But the evolution of
traits which benefit a group while harming individuals is notoriously fraught. Philosophers interested in the
role of moral emotions as underpinnings of naturalized ethics (Joyce, 2007; Ramsey and Deem, 2015; Deem
and Ramsey, 2016b,a) have recently begun to ask: how do we account for the evolution of this puzzling
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emotion?
Evolutionary game theory is a branch of mathematics used to model the evolution of strategic behavior in
humans and animals. This framework is not traditionally employed to understand the evolution of emotions
because emotions, simpliciter, are not behaviors. Extensive literature from evolutionary game theory on
the evolution of cooperation, altruism, and apology can shed light on the evolution of guilt, however, by
showing where and when guilt can provide individual fitness benefits to actors by dint of causing adaptive
behaviors.1 In this paper, we discuss implications of previous results in evolutionary game theory for the
evolution of guilt. We also provide novel modeling work, focusing especially on the conditions under which
guilty apology can evolve. As we show, in evolutionary models where actors play an iterated prisoner’s
dilemma and sometimes err, guilt can evolve to facilitate forgiveness and social reparation. Guilt functions
in this setting by either ensuring the trustworthiness of apology, or by leading apologizers to pay a cost.
This model adds to previous literature on the evolution of apology by showing how both emotion-reading
and costly apology can interact to stabilize guilt, and by exploring in greater depth the conditions under
which guilty apology is particularly likely to evolve.2
In section 2 we describe the inferential strategy by which we use evolutionary game theoretic results to
provide insight into the evolution of guilt. We also discuss basic insights into the conditions under which
guilt provides individual fitness benefits to actors. In section 3 we present our evolutionary model of guilty
apology, and clarify conditions under which guilt is likely to evolve to play this strategic role. As we will
show, guilty apology is more likely to evolve when guilt is hard to fake, actors interact repeatedly over long
periods of time, and the costs to apology are not too high. We argue that these models can help determine
conditionals of the form ‘ceterus paribus, if x obtains, guilt provides greater individual fitness benefits’ that
emotions researchers can employ in forming and assessing more detailed accounts of the evolution of guilt. In
addition, these modeling results may be informative for those working with artificial systems of interactive
agents.
2 Previous Work: Evolutionary Game Theory and Guilt
Evolutionary game theoretic models involve two basic elements—games and dynamics. Games are simplified
representations of strategic interactions. Dynamics specify how a population of actors playing a game will
1For work doing just this see Han et al. (2013); O’Connor (2016); Pereira et al. (2016, 2017a); Martinez-Vaquero et al. (2015);
Lenaerts et al. (2017).
2Relatedly, Huttegger et al. (2015) show how in the general case of costly signaling, if signals are hard to fake the costs
necessary to guarantee them are lower.
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change, or evolve, Which behaviors (or strategies) in the game will become more prevalent as evolution
progresses? Which will disappear? The answer will typically depend on how beneficial those strategies turn
out to be for the actors.
Games, in evolutionary models, are characterized by three things—players, strategies, and payoffs.3 These
correspond to the agents involved in an interaction, their possible behaviors, and what they get for their
behaviors, respectively. There is no resource here for representing the emotional state of an actor. This
might make the evolutionary game theoretic framework seem like a poor one for elucidating the evolution
of guilt. Inasmuch as emotions in humans are causally connected to behaviors, however, we can use these
models to gain insight into what functional role emotions might play. If we see a behavior X selected for in
environment Y , and we know that emotion Z causes that behavior in humans, we can conclude that emotion
Z should come under positive selection pressure in Y as well (O’Connor, 2016).
Guilt, our focus here, is associated with three classes of behaviors in humans. First, the anticipation of
guilt prevents social transgression (Tangney et al., 1996). It is thus correlated with altruistic and cooperative
behavior in humans, as well as decreased norm violation (Regan, 1971; Ketelaar and Tung Au, 2003; Malti
and Krettenauer, 2013). Second, the experience of guilt leads to a suite of reparative behaviors including
apology, gift giving, acceptance of punishment, and self punishment (Silfver, 2007; Ohtsubo and Watanabe,
2009; Nelissen and Zeelenberg, 2009). Lastly, expressions of guilt lead to decreased punishing behaviors, and
forgiveness, by group members (Eisenberg et al., 1997; Gold and Weiner, 2000; Fischbacher and Utikal, 2013).
If we find, in evolutionary models, that these sorts of behaviors provide selective advantages to individuals,
we identify a situation in which guilt can provide a selective advantage as well. O’Connor (2016) identifies
three sets of evolutionary game theoretic results that can inform the evolution of guilt. Before continuing to
our work on guilty apology, we will give a quick overview of these results.
2.1 Guilt leads to punishment avoidance
This result employs the famous prisoner’s dilemma game, which we will describe at length in section 3, to
model the evolution of altruism. In evolutionary game theory, altruism refers to any behavior in which an
agent decreases their own payoff in order to increase another agent’s payoff. The primary mechanisms that
can create individual level benefits for altruism are reciprocity and punishment.4
3Games can also represent information that agents have about each other and the structure of the game, but in evolutionary
scenarios, this element is less important.
4See Nowak (2006) for an overview of the evolution of altruism in the prisoner’s dilemma. Other factors like group and
kin selection can lead to the evolution of altruism, but not through individual fitness benefits. Network reciprocity, where
individuals encounter and copy neighbors, can also stabilize altruism, but in each of these cases any individual who cooperates
would do better to switch to defecting. For this reason, in thinking about when guilt provides a selective advantage we focus
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If actors can remember others’ past actions and reciprocate—by behaving altruistically towards altruists
and selfishly towards the selfish—altruism can be directly beneficial to the individual. Emotions that promote
altruism, such as guilt, are likewise beneficial in such a scenario. Guilt can provide a benefit to an agent
who, anticipating feeling badly about taking advantage of another group member, elects not to, and thus
escapes reciprocal selfishness from that group member.
When actors punish those who fail to behave altruistically, likewise altruism, and guilt, are directly
beneficial to the individual.5 If an actor anticipates the experience of guilt, and so chooses not to steal
from a friend, say, this might be beneficial if that actor then escapes punishment for their behavior. Human
groups engage both in reciprocity and in punishment, suggesting that guilt can provide a selective advantage
in these groups by preventing failures of altruism (Boyd et al., 2003; Boyd and Richerson, 2009).
2.2 Guilt stabilizes risky cooperation
In models that employ the “stag hunt” game to represent mutually beneficial, but risky, cooperation, guilt
can benefit actors by stabilizing such cooperative behavior. In these types of interactions, it always benefits
actors to cooperate when their partners do as well, even in the face of transient temptation to do otherwise.
An emotion, like guilt, that promotes cooperation will then provide individual benefits to any actor in
a generally cooperative group of this sort. For example, suppose two actors have agreed to hunt a stag
together, or cooperate, but one is tempted to hunt a hare instead, i.e., to seek short term, less risky, payoff.
If anticipation of guilt keeps this actor focused on the stag hunt, and their partner pulls through, they will
eventually receive greater rewards for sticking to the larger, if riskier, joint project. Alexander (2007) shows
that cooperation in the stag hunt is especially likely to evolve in groups where the same actors tend to keep
interacting, as in early human groups. (See Skyrms (2004) for more on the stag hunt and the evolution of
cooperation.) To be completely explicit, the benefit guilt provides here is in keeping actors dedicated to
risky joint projects.
on situations where it will be individually beneficial. For theoretical discussion of group and kin selection explanations of guilt,
see Deem and Ramsey (2016b).
5The evolution of punishment presents the so-called ‘second order free rider problem’. If punishment is costly, individuals
should prefer to leave punishment to others, and systems of punishment should dissolve. While models have been developed to
solve this problem, for our purposes the observation that really matters is that for whatever reason humans do, in fact, punish
transgressive group members. (Panchanathan and Boyd (2004) give a good overview of this literature, and show how indirect
reciprocity can circumvent the second order free rider problem.
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2.3 Guilt allows agents to recover from mistakes
Apology can benefit individuals playing the iterated prisoner’s dilemma—a version of the game where the
same actors repeatedly are engaged in an opportunity for altruism. Strategies that reciprocate by refusing to
behave altruistically towards selfish types can do well, but they suffer a problem when faced with accidental
bad behavior by a partner. These strategies can become locked in a spiral of mutual negative reciprocation,
which hurts all involved.
Imagine, for example, interactive partners who regularly share meat. Suppose that after one hunt a
partner fails to do so because they are especially hungry. If these actors reciprocate, the slighted partner
will fail to share meat after the next hunt, leading the other partner to fail to share in following interactions,
and so on. Actors who apologize, and accept the apologies of group members, can gain thus an advantage in
such conditions.6 These apologies can work if they are costly (Okamoto and Matsumura, 2000; Ohtsubo and
Watanabe, 2009; Ho, 2012; Han et al., 2013; Martinez-Vaquero et al., 2015; Lenaerts et al., 2017), if they are
unfakeable, or if they combine elements of costly and unfakeable apology (O’Connor, 2016). (In the next
section, we will explain at length why this is so.) Pereira et al. (2016) connect these models of apology to
the evolution of guilt. Pereira et al. (2017a,b) follow another tack and present an evolutionary model where
guilt causes self-punishment in the presence of a guilt-prone interactive partner. These results indicate that
the often costly apologies generated by the experience of guilt may nonetheless provide individual fitness
benefits in the long run by incentivizing group members to accept guilty actors into the social fold after bad
behavior.
The models we present here expand on this body of work. Our paper explores the issue from a different
angle by focusing on the trade-off between costs of apology and unfake-ability in stabilizing the evolution of
guilty apology. This focus on emotion-reading and unfakeable signals means that our model is more tuned
into explaining guilt in particular—which as an emotion acts as its own signal between humans—rather
than apology in general. In addition, the results here provide a robustness check on some of these previous
results by deriving them under substantially different modeling choices. Our model, in particular, makes
fewer assumptions about the rationality of players, and thus is again more directed at the particular case of
6This is not to say that apology is the only solution to this sort of retribution problem. The strategy ‘tit-for-two-tats’
does not begin retaliating until a partner has defected twice, and so is less likely to enter spirals of defection (Axelrod and
Axelrod, 1984). Likewise, ‘generous tit-for-tat’, where actors usually reciprocate, but sometimes play cooperation in response
to defection instead, can invade a population playing tit-for-tat, and maintain a lower level of retribution (Nowak and Sigmund,
1992). The Pavlov strategy involves players who cooperate whenever their last play matched that of their opponent, and solves
the retribution problem (though it is vulnerable to defectors) (Nowak et al., 1993). The goal here is not to show that apology
is the only solution to spirals of defection, but simply that it is a solution, and to argue that this can help explain the evolution
of guilty apology. (Note also that since guilt plays a role in other prosocial behaviors, it is available for co-option to solve the
retribution problem.)
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guilt.7
Note that while all three sets of results mentioned describe conditions under which guilt can be selective,
there is nothing here suggesting that guilt is somehow necessary in these situations. An organism does not
need to feel guilt to behave altruistically. This may lead one to ask: how do these models tell us anything
about guilt, rather than simply altruistic, cooperative, and apologetic behavior? Of course, evolution can
solve problems in different ways. Observing that giraffes evolved long necks to reach trees does not mean
that giraffes had to evolve long necks to eat. The fact that these human behaviors might be caused by
other cognitive mechanisms, though, is besides the point in this case. We know that guilt did evolve, so the
explanatory demand is to say what conditions might have caused this despite the possible fitness detriments
associated with guilt, not to show that guilt is the only way to solidify altruism, cooperation, and apology
in humans.
3 Guilty Apology
We now turn to our model of guilty apology.
A prisoner’s dilemma is a two-player game in which each player has two possible strategies: “cooperate”
and “defect”. If both players cooperate, they both get a moderate payoff (2, in our model). If one cooperates
and one defects, the cooperator gets nothing (0) and the defector gets a large payoff (3). If they both defect,
they both get a small payoff (1).8 In other words, mutual cooperation is preferable to mutual defection,
but each player does best to defect regardless of the other player’s choice. Cooperation in this game is an
altruistic strategy, as players who choose it incur a cost and increase their partner’s payoff. It should not be
confused with cooperation as modeled in the stag hunt, where actors obtain mutual benefits.
Player 2
Cooperate Defect
Player 1
Cooperate 2, 2 0, 3
Defect 3, 0 1, 1
Figure 1: A payoff table of the prisoner’s dilemma. Strategies for player one are represented by rows.
Strategies for player two are represented by columns. Entries to the table show payoffs for each combination
of strategies with player one listed first.
7For example, in showing how costs can stabilize apology in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma Martinez-Vaquero et al. (2015)
focus on the role of commitments to cooperate between agents who must then pay a cost upon breaking these commitments.
8We choose these values somewhat arbitrarily rather than looking at a generalized version of a prisoner’s dilemma. While
variation to the payoffs may lead to some small differences in our analyses (for example sizes of basins of attraction), it will not
lead to qualitative differences. Thus for tractability purposes we follow many past actors in simply choosing these payoffs.
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Figure 1 shows the payoff table for this game.9 Table entries show payoffs for each combination of
strategies with player one listed first. This game is a dilemma because both players are expected to defect,
despite the fact that mutual cooperation is preferred by everyone. The strategy pair where both players
defect is the only set of strategies for which no player can benefit by switching, or the only Nash equilibrium
of the game.
In an iterated prisoner’s dilemma, agents repeat the prisoner’s dilemma round after round with some
probability n. One can equivalently think of n as encoding the average number of rounds each encounter is
expected to last, as this is given by 11−n . For example, if n = 0.95, there will be an average of 20 rounds
played. These repeated interactions allow cooperation to gain a foothold in the game via reciprocation. One
such reciprocating strategy is called the “grim trigger”—players begin by cooperating, but if their partner
defects they immediately switch to defection for the rest of the interaction. In this way, they cooperate with
cooperators and defect with defectors, gaining the benefits from mutual cooperation and mitigating harm
from defectors.
This strategy runs into problems when players have a chance of accidentally performing the wrong
action—defecting instead of cooperating, or vice versa. These sorts of accidents occur for many reasons in
the real world. Actors under difficult conditions may behave antisocially despite general prosocial tendencies.
Actors might forget a cooperative agreement. Or actors might simply not feel cooperative today. Accidental
defection causes grim triggers to permanently defect on good, mostly cooperative partners. Mutual negative
reciprocation of this sort is mutually damaging.10 In such an environment, an apologetic strategy, which we
call the “guilt-prone grim trigger”, or just guilt-prone, for short, can outperform a punitive one. Guilt-prone
players act as grim triggers, but apologize after accidental defection. Upon receipt of such an apology, they
forgive and forget, and so return to cooperating. Note that guilt-prone, in this context, is a behavioral
strategy, rather than an explicit representation of actors who, in fact, experience some emotion. The idea is
that the behavioral strategy corresponds to the actions that someone experiencing guilt would take, and so
investigating the success of this strategy can tell us something about the circumstances under which guilt is
adaptive.
This strategy assumes individuals combine two aspects of behavior that need not go together—apologizing
after defection and forgiving those who apologize. As we will see, this can be a successful strategy, but its
9Note that there is nothing special about the particular numbers in this payoff table. This game is a prisoners dilemma by
virtue of the ordering of the payoffs only. We fixed these values for computational expedience, but changing them does not
effect the qualitative features of the results we will present.
10O’Connor (2016) also looks at “tit-for-tat”, another reciprocating strategy, as do Martinez-Vaquero et al. (2015), and find
similar results to ours. We focus on the grim trigger here because while the qualitative results are similar between the two
models, the analysis is neater for grim trigger.
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success depends on the presence of both behaviors. In this way, it mimics ‘secret handshakes’—where two
actors use some private signal to determine who to cooperate with, and only trust those who know the signal
(Robson, 1990). It is also similar to greenbeards in the biological realm—traits that need not have anything
to do with altruism, but that are used to coordinate altruism among those with the trait (Gardner and West,
2010). One missing part of the account here is how these behaviors become linked in the first place. This
lack, however, does not undermine the account we will provide of the stability and evolution of a strategy
in which they are linked.
One problem with the guilt-prone strategy is that an apology will not effectively signal guilt if defectors
can also use it to convince their partners to cooperate, even though they intend to continue to defect. Another
way of putting this is that guilty apology might not be evolutionarily viable if fake apologizers, which we
will call fakers, can take advantage of the forgiving nature of guilt-prone players (Martinez-Vaquero et al.,
2015).
As we mentioned in the last section, there are two lines of defense against such fakers. One is for guilty
apologies to be unfakeable. This relates to arguments by Frank (1988) that moral emotions, such as guilt,
evolve as honest signals of cooperative intent in humans. Empirical evidence suggests that humans do trust
signals of guilt from group members to some degree when deciding whether to forgive and forget, but that
guilt, unlike some emotions, is not associated with stereotyped facial and body postures (Deem and Ramsey,
2016b). In other words, it is not entirely unfakeable. For this reason, in our model we assume that guilt-prone
types always manage to successfully apologize and fakers are successful with some probability less than or
equal to one but greater than zero.
Another way to discourage fakers is to impose a cost for apologizing. When guilt-prone types apologize
to each other, they are able to re-enter a potentially long cooperative engagement where they both reap the
benefits of mutual aid. This means that the expected benefit of apologizing is high. When fakers apologize,
they defect the next round, necessitating another costly apology if they wish to re-enter the social fold.
This means that the benefit to fakers of apologizing is a short period of defection, which yields a relatively
small payoff. These differential benefits mean that paying an identical cost will be less worthwhile for fakers
than guilt-prone types under many conditions. For example, imagine two actors, each of whom has stolen
a cupcake and is deciding whether to issue a costly apology. The actor who is planning a long, cooperative
life with the cupcake maker will receive a large benefit from doing so. The actor who will steal a cupcake
tomorrow only receives a small benefit before having to pay the cost again.
To summarize, our model works as follows. We assume that a population of actors plays the iterated
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prisoner’s dilemma where every round the game continues with probability n. Each round, there is a
probability a that actors accidentally perform the wrong action—that those who usually cooperate in fact
defect, or vice versa. (This is the condition under which reciprocation can be harmful, and apology is
potentially useful.) The strategies in the population are:
C – Unconditional cooperation, or always cooperate in every round
D – Unconditional defection, or always defect in every round
GT – Grim trigger, cooperate unless your partner defects, and then defect for every following round
GP – Guilt prone, play grim trigger, apologize upon defection, and cooperate with those who apologize
F – Faker, always defect, apologize upon defecting
There is some probability p ≤ 1 that fakers successfully signal guilt. And in order to apologize, actors
pay a cost, as described above. To allow for the further possibility that actually guilty types pay a lower cost
than fakers to convince others of their guilt we define c ≥ d where c is the cost of apology for guilt-prone
types and d for fakers. The idea here is that if those who experience the real emotion make very convincing
apologies, their interactive partners might not require costly reparations from them. After choosing values for
our parameters, we can generate a payoff table for each strategy based on the expected outcome for playing
an iterated prisoners dilemma under these conditions. For the details of these calculations see appendix A.
The guilt-prone strategy in this model matches empirical observations of guilt after transgression in the
following ways. Guilt-prone actors are more likely to apologize. They are willing to pay a cost to do so.
Upon receipt of this apology, group members decrease their punishing behavior. And guilt-prone individuals
are in fact likely to behave prosocially in the future. Furthermore, guilt-prone individuals may be better at
convincing others that they really do intend to cooperate in the future than those who apologize without
feeling guilt. By looking at the evolution of this strategy in the model, then, we hope to gain insight into
the actual conditions under which guilty apology evolves.
3.1 When Can Guilt Evolve?
In this section we will address the conditions under which guilt-prone is an evolutionarily stable strategy
(ESS). ESSes are strategies where populations playing them cannot be invaded by a small number of actors
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using a different strategy. This is because ESSes are strategies that do better against themselves than other
strategies do against them.11
It is also the case that for the replicator dynamics, the most commonly used model of evolutionary change
in evolution game theory, ESSes are stable.12 If populations evolve to them, they stay there, absent other
forces. For this reason, an ESS analysis is a way of identifying strategies that have the potential to evolve
in a model. Because of this potential, ESS analysis has been employed extensively in biology and the social
sciences to gain insight into evolutionary properties of many sorts of populations.13,14
In the models we consider, unconditional cooperation is never an ESS, because defection does better
against it than it does against itself. Unconditional defection is always an ESS, because it always does
better against itself than any other strategy does against it. The grim-trigger is also an ESS, for the same
reason. (This is true as long as the cost for apology is not 0, in which case guilt-proneness can invade).
Guilt-proneness is sometimes an ESS, because it too does better against itself than other strategies, though
it is destabilized by successful fakers under some parameter values. (Fakers, in turn, are eventually replaced
by defectors who do not pay costs to apologize—faking is never an ESS).15 As it turns out, the guilt-prone
strategy is evolutionarily stable against fakers in a sizable portion of the parameter space. This means that
there are many conditions under which guilt-proneness can potentially evolve. As we will see, both higher
cost of apology, c, and lower probability of fake apologies working, p, helps protect guilt-prone players against
fakers. For now, we will assume that c = d, or that both types pay the same cost for apology.
In order for the guilt-prone strategy to be an ESS given a fixed error rate, a = 0.01, and chance of repeat
encounter, n, figure 2 shows that the harder an apology is to fake, the cheaper the cost of apology needs to
be. Alternatively, the higher the cost, the less fakeable an apology needs to be. Note that this figure only
shows conditions under which guilt is stable against fakers—we will discuss other strategies shortly.
This graph also indicates that for longer interactions (larger n) guilt is stable under wider conditions,
i.e., with lower cost, c, and higher fakeability, p. This makes sense, since the more rounds that are played on
average, the more likely a guilt-prone player is to reap benefits of long interactions with other guilt-prone
types, and the more likely they catch on and disbelieve a fake apology, thus depriving the faker of the benefits
11To be more precise strategy xi is an ESS if u(xi, xj) is the payoff of strategy xi played against xj and: 1) u(xi, xi) > u(xi, xj)
or 2) u(xi, xi) = u(xi, xj) and u(xi, xj) > u(xj , xj) for all xj 6= xi.
12For more on the replicator dynamics, including the discrete-time version employed in the next section, see Weibull (1997).
13See Smith and Price (1973) for more on the role of ESS analysis in evolutionary game theory.
14All this said, ESSes are not the only stable states under the replicator dynamics, and sometimes ESSes are quite unlikely to
evolve. Huttegger and Zollman (2013) discuss problems with ESS methodology as opposed to dynamical analyses. O’Connor
(2015) discusses a particular example, the evolution of learning, where ESS analysis is misleading. In the next section we will
move to a dynamical analysis for these reasons.
15This is the case unless the costs to apologizing are zero, in which case defection cannot invade faking as they both simply
defect against each other and pay no costs to do so.
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Figure 2: Minimum cost, c, for guilt-prone to be an ESS vs. faker, for each fakeability value p, with error
rate a = 0.01. When faking is easier, as p goes to one, the cost for guilt-prone to be an ESS is higher. As n,
increases, this cost is lower, because guilt-prone types do well in longer repeated interactions.
of defecting against a cooperator for the rest of the encounter.
One might also be interested in determining under which conditions the guilt-prone strategy is an ESS
versus other strategies. When not playing against fakers, fakeability (p) no longer matters. Figure 3 shows
the minimum length of interaction (n) for which the guilt-prone strategy is an ESS versus grim trigger,
unconditional cooperation, and unconditional defection when the error rate is a = 0.01. The guilt-prone
strategy is an ESS for most of the parameter space we’ve been looking at, i.e., low costs and high chance
of repetition. As error rate, a, increases, length of play needs to increase for the guilt-prone strategy to be
an ESS, but little changes in the range that we focus on. Note that in early human groups, we expect the
length of repeated interaction to have been very high, meaning that guilt-prone should do well under these
conditions.
Before continuing, it will be useful to take a moment to discuss the results just presented. The take-away
from these models is an understanding of the conditions under which guilt, for the purposes of promoting
costly apology, can potentially evolve. This model is best understood not as a ‘how-possibly’ or just-so
story for the evolution of guilt, but rather as a tool for researchers who do more detailed work on this
evolution to evaluate the plausibility of various evolutionary pathways to modern, human guilt. It yields for
us conditionals along the lines of ‘if X, then guilt provides individual benefits/comes under positive selection
pressure/will evolve ceterus paribus’, that can be taken as evidence used to support or deny proper accounts
of the evolution of guilt.
We can summarize these conditionals as follows: (1) When humans interact for long periods of time,
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Figure 3: Minimum likelihood of repeated encounter, n, for guilt-prone to be an ESS against defectors,
cooperators, and grim triggers, error rate a = 0.01. As the costs of apologizing increase, longer interactions
are necessary for guilt-prone to be an ESS against all strategies.
guilty apology is more evolvable, because in these cases there are long, fruitful interactions to be gained
by those who can forgive and forget. (2) When guilt is hard to fake, perhaps because humans are good at
reading the emotions of other humans, again it has more potential to evolve. (In the same cases, note, there
might be selection pressure to read these very emotions, if actors who can do so have a route to successful
apology.) But actors need not be perfect emotion readers for guilt to be successful at promoting apology. (3)
For various levels of fakeability, there will be costs to apology that allow guilt to evolve. In other words, if
guilt creates some individual costs to the agent, which, as discussed, occurs in real human populations in the
form of self-punishment, acceptance of punishment from others, and reparations, this can help guilt evolve
even in populations with fakers. As described, guilt-prone types reap a disproportionately high benefit from
apologizing, which makes the costs more worth their while than for fakers.
In the next section, we will expand this analysis by looking, in detail, not just at whether guilt can evolve
to promote apology under certain conditions, but how likely this evolution is.
3.2 The Robustness of Guilty Apology
We have now seen that guilt-proneness can evolve in order to promote costly and/or honest apology. In this
section, we will describe, in some greater detail, the conditions under which guilt is likely to evolve for this
function. ESS analyses are useful because they tell us something about which strategies have the potential
to evolve. Some ESSes, however, have very small basins of attraction under the replicator dynamics. A basin
of attraction, for an equilibrium, is the set of population states that evolve to that equilibrium.
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What does this mean? The states of an evolutionary population correspond to the possible proportions
of strategies in that population—50% fakers, 10% guilt-prone, and 40% cooperators, for example, or 100%
grim triggers. In an evolutionary model using the replicator dynamics, each such state will evolve based
on which strategies are doing relatively well. Successful strategies will propagate, while less successful ones
decline. Eventually this process will (usually) lead the population to an equilibrium, or a state where it does
not evolve anymore.16 In our model, these equilibria are the ESSes of the game. Basins of attraction tell us
what proportion of states eventually end up at each ESS. For this reason, the size of a basin of attraction
tells us something about the evolvability of a strategy. Equilibrium strategies with large basins are more
likely to evolve in a population than ones with small basins (assuming no knowledge about the starting state
of the population).
Mutations, or noise, in evolutionary processes, which tend to occur regularly in the real world, can also
move populations from one equilibrium to another. Equilibria with large basins of attraction tend to be
harder to disrupt, while those with small ones are typically easier to move away from. In models explicitly
representing this sort of noise, populations tend to spend most of their time at equilibria with large basins of
attraction. Again, this means we should think of ESSes with large basins of attraction as likelier to evolve.
We thus want to ask: under what conditions does guilt-proneness, as represented in our model, have a
larger basin of attraction? What are the factors that make it likely to evolve and be stable for the purpose
of promoting apology? There are a few parameters to consider in answering this question. We can ask what
happens to the basin of attraction for guilt-proneness when we vary p, the probability that fakers successfully
trick others into trusting their apologies, c, the cost of apology for guilt-prone players, and d, the cost of
apology for fakers.17
Let us start with p. In models without fakers, guilt-prone types do better. Fakers can be thought of as
siphoning away the benefits of guilty apology. For this reason, holding other conditions fixed, guilt-proneness
has a larger basin of attraction whenever p is smaller. If guilt is hard to fake, it is more likely to evolve.
The role of c and d, the costs for apology, are a little more subtle. First, consider the case where c = d,
or fakers and guilt-prone types pay the same cost. When p is low, guilt-prone types do well against fakers.
For this reason, increasing costs actually makes guilt-proneness less likely to evolve. It simply decreases
the payoffs to guilt-prone types, while failing to significantly help them differentiate themselves from fakers.
When p is higher, cost can help guilt-prone types evolve. It allows them to prove their cooperative intent
16See O’Connor (2016) for a bit more on the replicator dynamics in this sort of model.
17We measure basins of attraction by randomly initializing 10k populations for each parameter value and using the discrete
time replicator dynamics to determine the equilibrium each starting point ends up at. For more on this concept see, for example,
Sandholm (2010).
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compared to faker types.
Figure 4 shows the sizes of the basin of attraction for guilt-proneness, as opposed to defection, in games
where p and c vary, a = .01 and n = 0.95. The basins of attraction were measured using the discrete time
replicator dynamics. Results are from 10000 simulations run until the population was clearly converging to
one of the two rest points—all play guilt-prone, or all play defect.18 The strategies included were uncondi-
tional cooperation (C), unconditional defection (D), guilt-prone grim trigger (GP), and faker (F). The x-axis
tracks cost, c = d, which ranges from .005 to 1. The y-axis shows the basin of attraction for guilt-proneness.
For p = 0.95, when fakers are able to almost always convince others of their cooperative intent, the optimal
cost for the evolution of guilty apology, of those explored, is 0.4. For p = 0.9, when fakers are slightly less
successful, the optimal cost is 0.2. For the smaller values of p, costs make guilt less likely to evolve. In other
words, the easier it is for fakers to convince others they are telling the truth, the higher the costs that make
guilt-prone most likely to evolve.
Figure 4: Sizes of basin of attraction for guilt-prone strategy as c = d, cost of apology for guilt-prone and
fakers, and p, likelihood that fakers successfully apologize, vary. For high values of p, costs increase the basins
of attraction for guilt-prone to a point. For low values of p, costs only hurt the evolvability of guilt-prone.
Lower p always makes the basin of attraction of guilt-prone larger.
The other situation worth considering here is the one where d > c, or where fakers must pay some
greater cost to apologize. The idea is that their apologies are less convincing and so social partners exact an
extra cost before trusting their apologies. Figure 5 shows basins of attraction for guilt in these models with
probability of successful faking (p) held fixed at 0.95 and error rate, a = 0.01. Two data sets are pictured
here. For the first, c = 0—guilt-prone types pay no cost to apologize—and d ranges from 0.01 to 0.9, meaning
18Simulation starting points were chosen over all possible population proportions using a uniform distribution.
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fakers pay various costs to apologize. For the second, c = 0.2—a small cost for guilty apology—and d ranges
from 0.21 to 0.9. In both cases, increasing d, the cost to fakers, while holding c fixed, increases the likelihood
that guilt evolves. When there is a cost for guilt, this generally decreases the likelihood it will evolve. Both
these results should be unsurprising. Costs for fakers make faking a less successful strategy, and stabilize
guilt. Costs for guilty apology make guilty types less successful and allow defection to evolve more often.
In all the results just shown, we hold a, error rate, and n, probability of repeated interaction, fixed.
For larger n, generally, guilt proneness will be more evolvable. As long as a is relatively small, changes to
this parameter value do not significantly alter results. As mentioned, the grim trigger is also an ESS of
this model, and adding this strategy can shift evolutionary outcomes. When costs of apology are low, the
presence of the grim trigger increases the basin of attraction for guilt proneness because it disproportionately
hurts defectors and fakers. When costs are higher, the grim trigger is so successful itself that it decreases
the basin of attraction for guilty apology. In general, the addition of this strategy to the mix supports the
claim that guilty apology is only evolutionarily viable when costs for apology are small and emotion reading
helps deter fakers.
Figure 5: Sizes of basin of attraction for guilt-prone where d ≥ c, or costs to fakers are higher than costs to
guilt-prone to apologize. When p, probability of faking, is lower, or when c, cost for apology, is smaller, or
when d, cost for fake apology, is larger, guilt-prone has a larger basin of attraction.
Again, these models generate a set of conditionals that now tell us something like, ‘if X, then guilt-prone
will be more likely to evolve, and to be stable, for the purposes of apology’. When guilt is easier to honestly
convey, it is more likely that guilty apology will evolve and be stable. As in the last section, this makes
sense. Guilt-proneness helps both players in the case of apology, one to identify a good cooperative partner
even in the face of defection, and the other to convince group members to accept them back into the fold
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after messing up. As long as fakers can be kept at bay, this benefit obtains, and reading emotions helps this
happen. Extra costs to fakers to apologize help guilty apology evolve, for the same reasons. These could
obtain if, for example, group members are somewhat able to read emotions, and level extra costs for apology
on those who do not seem genuine enough.
And lastly, costs for apologizing have a less straightforward impact on the likelihood that guilty apology
evolves. They improve its chances when there are tricky fakers about by disincentivizing fake apology. On
the other hand, they make it harder to sustain guilt because the costs straightforwardly harm the guilty
individuals. The best conditions for the evolution of guilty apology would be those where actors can simply
tell who is genuine and who faking. Of course, we should be so lucky.
4 Conclusion
Results from evolutionary models indicate that there are many conditions that can make guilt-proneness
individually beneficial for actors. When it comes to benefits to guilt before bad behavior, these include the
presence of reciprocating, or punishing group members, and the presence of established, mutually beneficial
patterns of cooperation. When it comes to benefits after bad behavior, guilt can help actors if it allows for
unfakeable apology, costly apology, or some combination of the two of these. Guilt is particularly likely to
evolve and be stable for this function if it is harder to fake, either in the sense that group members do not
believe fake apologizers, or in the sense that they levy higher costs to ensure the apologies of faker types.
It is also especially beneficial in repeated interactions. Costs for apology improve the evolvability of guilt
when fakers are more successful, but hamper the success of guilt prone types otherwise.
One might object that the models presented here do not explicitly represent the role of culture in guilt.
Culture seems likely to have played a role in the evolution of guilt, and clearly plays a role in the production of
guilt in modern societies. We do not mean to downplay the importance of cultural elements in the evolution
of guilt. Rather, we think these models provide insight whether or not guilt, and the environment that it
evolved in, are culturally evolved. To put it another way, if we, as suggested, think of these models as giving
us conditions under which guilt provides significant benefits, and so is more evolvable, these conditions may
be produced by a culturally evolved social environment or a more straightforwardly biologically evolved one,
and furthermore, they will provide benefits for culturally produced guilty behaviors as well as biological ones.
Our if-then statements are broadly applicable. This is, of course, especially useful given that the details of
the evolutionary environment of humans are sometimes murky. The mathematical models presented here
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are one more tool to use to gain clarity.
In addition, there is interest in the AI and computation communities in understanding the role some-
thing like guilt might play in artificial systems (Pereira et al., 2016, 2017a,b). In this case, the goal of an
evolutionary model of guilt is not to accurately represent the historical pathways by which guilt might have
evolved, but to show possibilities for how to stabilize guilt and cooperation in an evolving system. These
models elucidate such pathways.
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A Calculations of Expected Return
Here we show how we calculated the payoffs used in the above analysis for the iterated prisoner’s dilemma.
The payoff table in figure 1 gives the expected return for a single round based on each of four possible
action pairs performed by the players. However, this does not take in to account the fact that both players
have a chance a of performing the wrong action, and that guilt-prone players and fakers pay a cost c when
they defect, which changes their expected return from defecting. Moreover, we’re primarily interested in
total expected return over some unknown number of repeated interactions as determined by n. For some
strategies, the action performed in a given round depends on actions of the other player in previous rounds:
whether they made mistakes, and (for guilt-prone players vs. fakers) whether they effectively apologized for
defecting.
We’ll first calculate expected single-round payoffs for each intended action pair, and then use this infor-
mation to calculate total expected return for a complete interaction between each pair of strategies. This
total does not denote actual return from an interaction, as interactions involve probabilistic elements in the
form of n, a, and p, but can be thought of as an average over a large number of such interactions.
Expected return each round
Here we show how to calculate each single-round action’s expected return, by taking the sum of entry in
the payoff table for player 1 multiplied by the probability that they get that payoff when performing that
action, considering player 2’s action, the error rate a, and the cost of apologizing c (if the strategy involves
apology).
CC denotes the expected return for each player for a round in which both players intend to cooperate. This
is given by:
CC = 2(1− a)2 + 3a(1− a) + 0(1− a)a + 1a2 = 2− a
CC∗ : expected return for a player who intends to cooperate this round, but will pay a cost of c to apologize
if they accidentally defect, playing another player who intends to cooperate.
CC∗ = 2(1− a)2 + (3− c)a(1− a) + 0(1− a)a + (1− c)a2 = 2− a− ca
CD : expected return for a player who intends to cooperate this round, playing a player who intends to
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defect.
CD = 0(1− a)2 + 1a(1− a) + 2(1− a)a + 3a2 = 3a
CD∗ : expected return for a player who intends to cooperate this round, but will pay a cost of c to apologize
if they accidentally defect, playing a player who intends to defect.
CD∗ = 0(1− a)2 + (1− c)a(1− a) + 2(1− a)a + (3− c)a2 = 3a− ca
DC : expected return for a player who intends to defect this round, playing a player who intends to cooperate.
DC = 3(1− a)2 + 2a(1− a) + 1(1− a)a + 0a2 = 3− 3a
DC∗ : expected return for a player who intends to defect this round but apologize for defecting, playing a
player who intends to cooperate.
DC∗ = (3− c)(1− a)2 + 2a(1− a) + (1− c)(1− a)a + 0a2 = 3− 3a− c(1− a)
DD : expected return for a player who intends to defect this round, playing a player who also intends to
defect.
DD = 1(1− a)2 + 0a(1− a) + 3(1− a)a + 2a2 = 1 + a
DD∗ : expected return for a player who intends to defect this round but apologize for it, playing a player
who also intends to defect.
DD∗ = (1− c)(1− a)2 + 0a(1− a) + (3− c)(1− a)a + 2a2 = 1 + a− c(1− a)
Total expected return
In what follows, Exp(A,B) denotes the total return payoff for a player using strategy A against a player
using strategy B. The expected return each round is the sum of the each of the above single-round expected
payoffs times the probability that they will be instantiated. When grim trigger players are involved, this
probability is based on the error rate a for their opponent the previous round, as well as probability p of a
faker’s apology working in the case of guilt-prone players vs. fakers. The total expected return, then, is the
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sum of the expected return each round i, times the probability ni that there will be an ith round.19
Exp(C,C) =
∞∑
i=0
CC(ni) = (2− a)
∞∑
i=0
ni =
2− a
1− n
Exp(C,D) = Exp(C,F ) =
∞∑
i=0
CD(ni) = 3a
∞∑
i=0
ni =
3a
1− n
Exp(D,C) =
∞∑
i=0
DC(ni) = (3− 3a)
∞∑
i=0
ni =
3− 3a
1− n
Exp(D,D) = Exp(D,F ) =
∞∑
i=0
DD(ni) = (1 + a)
∞∑
i=0
ni =
1 + a
1− n
Exp(GP,GP ) =
∞∑
i=0
CC∗(ni) = (2− a− ca)
∞∑
i=0
ni =
2− a− ca
1− n
Exp(GP,C) =
∞∑
i=0
[
(1− a)iCC∗ + (1− (1− a)i)DC∗]ni
=
∞∑
i=0
[
(1− a)i(2− a− ca) + (1− (1− a)i)(3− 2a− c)]ni
=
2a2n + ac− 4an + a + 2n− 2
(n− 1)(an− n + 1)
19The more complicated of these infinite sums are calculated in Mathematica.
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Exp(GP,D) =
∞∑
i=0
[
(1− ai)DD∗ + aiCD∗]ni
=
∞∑
i=0
[
(1− ai)(1 + a− c(1− a)) + ai(3a− ca)]ni
=
−a2cn− a2n + 3acn− ac− 3an + 3a− cn + n
(n− 1)(an− 1)
Exp(F,D) = Exp(F, F ) =
∞∑
i=0
DD∗(ni) = (1 + a− c(1− a))
∞∑
i=0
(ni)
=
1 + a− c(1− a)
1− n
Exp(F,C) =
∞∑
i=0
DC∗(ni) = (3− 2a− c)
∞∑
i=0
ni =
3− 2a− c
1− n
Exp(GT,D) = Exp(GT,F ) =
∞∑
i=0
[
(1− ai)DD + aiCD]ni
=
∞∑
i=0
[
(1− ai)(1 + a) + 3ai+1]ni
=
−a2n− 3an + 3a + n
(n− 1)(an− 1)
Exp(GT,C) =
∞∑
i=0
[
(1− a)iCC + (1− (1− a)i)DC]ni
=
∞∑
i=0
[
(1− a)i(2− a) + (1− (1− a)i)(3− 3a)]ni
=
3a2n− 4an + a + 2n− 2
(n− 1)(an− n + 1)
Exp(F,GP ) =
∞∑
i=0
[
(p− ap + a)iDC∗ + (1− (p− ap + a)i)DD∗]ni
=
∞∑
i=0
[
(p− ap + a)i(3− 3a− c + ca) + (1− (p− ap + a)i)(1 + a− c + ca)]ni
=
(a− 1)(c(an(p− 1)− np + 1) + n(a(p− 1) + p + 2)− 3)
(1− n)(an(p− 1)− np + 1)
Exp(GP,F ) =
∞∑
i=0
[
(p− ap + a)iCD∗ + (1− (p− ap + a)i)DD∗]ni
=
∞∑
i=0
[
(p− ap + a)i(3a− ca) + (1− (p− ap + a)i)(1 + a− c + ca)]ni
=
−a2cnp + a2cn− a2np + a2n + 2acnp− 3acn + ac + 3an− 3a− cnp + cn + np− n
(n− 1)(anp− an− np + 1)
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Exp(C,GP ) = Exp(C,GT ) =
∞∑
i=0
[
(1− a)iCC + (1− (1− a)i)CD]ni
=
∞∑
i=0
[
(1− a)i(2− a) + (1− (1− a)i)(3a)]ni
=
−3a2n− an + a + 2n− 2
(n− 1)(an− n + 1)
Exp(D,GP ) = Exp(D,GT ) =
∞∑
i=0
[
(1− ai)DD + aiDC]ni
=
∞∑
i=0
[
(1− ai)(1 + a) + ai(3− 3a)]ni
=
(a− 1)((a− 2)n + 3)
(1− n)(an− 1)
Exp(F,GT ) =
∞∑
i=0
[
aiDC∗ + (1− ai)DD∗]ni
=
∞∑
i=0
[
ai(3− 2a− c) + (1− ai)(1 + a− c(1− a))]ni
=
−a2cn− a2n + 2acn + 2an− 2a− c− 2n + 3
(n− 1)(an− 1)
Exp(GT,GT ), Exp(GT,GP ) and Exp(GP,GT ) are a bit more complicated. Luckily, though, the first two
are equal to one another and the third follows analogously. I computed Exp(GT,GT ) as follows:
Note that the expected return for round 1 in this case is:
E1 = CC
Next, note that if we write the expectation for each round i as
Ei = x(i)CC + y(i)CD + z(i)DC + w(i)DD,
we get that
Ei+1 = (1− a)2x(i)CC + (a(1− a)x(i) + ay(i))CD
+ (a(1− a)x(i) + az(i))DC + (a2x(i) + (1− a)y(i) + (1− a)z(i) + w(i))DD.
Considering x, y, z, and w as recursive functions with initial values x(0) = 1, y(0) = z(0) = w(0) = 0,
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(and plugging into Mathematica) we get:
x(i) = (1− a)2i−2
y(i) = z(i) =
a(ai − (1− a)2i
(a− 1)((a− 3)a + 1)
w(i) =
a(−2(a− 1)ai + a(1− a)2i + (1− a)2i + a− 3)− (1− a)2i + 1
(a− 1)2((a− 3)a + 1)
And at last we can express our final 3 expectations:
Exp(GT,GT ) = Exp(GT,GP )
=
∞∑
i=0
[
(1− a)2i−2CC + a(a
i − (1− a)2i)
(a− 1)((a− 3)a + 1)(CD + DC)
+
a(−2(a− 1)ai + a(1− a)2i + (1− a)2i + a− 3)− (1− a)2i + 1
(a− 1)2((a− 3)a + 1) DD
]
ni
=
∞∑
i=0
[
(1− a)2i−2(2− a) + a(a
i − (1− a)2i)
(a− 1)((a− 3)a + 1)(3)
+
a(−2(a− 1)ai + a(1− a)2i + (1− a)2i + a− 3)− (1− a)2i + 1
(a− 1)2((a− 3)a + 1) (1 + a)
]
ni
=
−2 + a− (−1 + a)(2 + a2)n− a(1 + (−3 + a)a2)n2
(−1 + a)2(−1 + n)(−1 + (−1 + a)2n)(−1 + an)
Exp(GP,GT ) =
∞∑
i=0
[
(1− a)2i−2CC∗ + a(a
i − (1− a)2i)
(a− 1)((a− 3)a + 1)(CD
∗ + DC∗)
+
a(−2(a− 1)ai + a(1− a)2i + (1− a)2i + a− 3)− (1− a)2i + 1
(a− 1)2((a− 3)a + 1) DD
∗
]
ni
=
∞∑
i=0
[
(1− a)2i−2(2− a− ca) + a(a
i − (1− a)2i)
(a− 1)((a− 3)a + 1)(3− c)
+
a(−2(a− 1)ai + a(1− a)2i + (1− a)2i + a− 3)− (1− a)2i + 1
(a− 1)2((a− 3)a + 1) (1 + a− c(1− a))
]
ni
=
[−(a4cn2) + 5a3cn2 − 4a2cn2 + acn2 − a4n2 + 3a3n2 − an2 − a3cn− a2cn− a3n + a2n
− 2an + 2n + ac + a− 2] /[(−1 + a)2(−1 + n)(−1 + an)(−1 + n− 2an + a2n)]
26
